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Abstract 
This study aims to obtain empirical evidence of career uncertainty as a moderator of the relationship between 
information asymmetry, budget emphasis, self esteem with budget slack on OPD in Gianyar regency with the 
number of 40 agencies, the sample used for 67 respondents. The research was conducted in Gianyar with survey 
method using questionnaire. The results show that career uncertainty weakens the positive relationship between 
information asymmetry and budget slack. The career uncertainty weakens the positive relationship between 
budget emphasis and budget slack. The career uncertainty strengthens the negative relationship between self 
esteem and budgetary slack. 
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1. Introduction 
A performance-based budget system is an efficient and participatory development process in the hope of 
improving agency performance. Regional budgets are drafted by the executive as agents and authorized by the 
legislature as principals. However, performance appraisals based on budget targets will encourage agents to 
budget slack for a better career path in the future (Suartana, 2010: 138). Fundamentally, budgeting is divided 
into two categories: top-down budgeting and bottom-up (participation). The process of preparing the government 
budget using the buttom up method. Buttom up is a method of budget preparation that is carried out from the 
lower level to the top or top level. Kartika (2016) mentions that the process of government budgeting is called 
Musrenbang (Musrenbang Pembangunan) from village level Musrenbang to Musrenbang national level (Central 
Government of Jakarta).The Musrenbang stages are as follows: First, the Musrenbang conducted at the village or 
kelurahan level (Musrenbang Kelurahan) discusses the needs of the village or kelurahan community to be 
planned and assisted by the government. Second, the Musrenbang conducted at the Sub-district level 
(Musrenbang Kelurahan) discussed the needs of the Kecamatan community to be planned and assisted by the 
government. Third, Musrenbang conducted at the district level (Musrenbang Kabupaten) which discussed 
whether the demand and desire of the community in accordance with the really needed the community. Fourth, 
Musrenbang conducted at Provincial level (Musrenbang at the provincial level) was conducted to assess whether 
the planning made by each district was in accordance with the vision of the President's mission and whether it 
was in accordance with the RPJMD (Regional Medium Term Development Plan) that had been agreed. Five, the 
National-level Musrenbang (Musrenbang Nasional) is a deliberation undertaken to review what each province 
has prepared and see the adequacy of public funds available. 
 In the process of public sector budgeting, especially local government organizations, upper to lower 
level management is directly involved in the preparation of a budget over a period of time. For everyone directly 
involved in the budgeting process the budget will have a direct impact on the behavior of its constituents. 
Behavior that arises in the form of positive and negative behavior. If the behaviors that appear are positive, then 
the vision and mission of the organization can run with a balanced in accordance with organizational goals. 
Conversely, if the constituent behavior is negative, then it could lead to budgetary slack (Warindrani, 2006: 99). 
Ajibolade, et al (2013) argues that the more tightly a budget the less likely the budgetary slack, otherwise if the 
budget is arranged flexibly then the possibility of budgetary slack will be greater. 
 Slack is the difference between the actual resources needed to efficiently complete a task and the larger 
amount of resources devoted to the task (Ikhsan, et al, 2011: 176). According to Suartana (2010: 138) budgetary 
slack occurs due to the determination of income is too low (understated) and the cost is too high (overstated). 
This can have adverse impacts on public sector organizations, ie resource allocation errors and biases in the 
evaluation of agency performance against the unit of accountability. In general, budgetary slack is seen as a 
serious obstacle in the effective use of organizational budgets (Yilmaz et al, 2011). 
 Judging from the agency theory, the process of budgeting is a follow-up of the contract between 
principals and agents (Parwati, et al, 2015). Agency theory explains the phenomenon that occurs when the boss 
delegates his authority to subordinates (agent) to perform a task or authorization to make decisions. If 
subordinates who participate in the budgeting process have specific information about local conditions, it will 
enable subordinates to provide information they have to help the interests of the company. However, often the 
wishes of superiors are not the same as subordinates, causing conflict of interest. This can happen for example, if 
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in conducting a policy of rewarding the company to subordinates based on the achievement of the budget. 
Subordinates tend to provide biased information so that the budget is easy to achieve and get rewards based on 
the achievement of the budget. This condition will obviously lead to budget slack. 
 
2. Theoritical Foundation 
2.1  Agency Theory 
The agency theory that is meant in the practice of the budget gap is influenced by the conflict of interest between 
management and the owner that arises when each party seeks to achieve the desired level of success. Conflicts in 
question can be seen in terms of reward from the principal to management on the basis of achieving budget 
targets in a company. In the enterprise budgeting process, participating managers are likely to provide 
information differently from the resources they ought to be, by raising the costs of what they ought to be or 
lowering the revenues from what the company should be able to achieve. It aims to target budget can be easily 
achieved so that managers will get compensation or rewards. Such conditions will obviously lead to budget gaps 
within a company. According to the agency theory perspective, the practice of budgetary slack is influenced by 
the conflict of interest between management acting as agent and owner acting as principal. The conflict arises 
when each party tries to achieve or maintain the desired level of prosperity. Agency theory gives an explanation 
of the phenomenon that occurs when superiors delegate authority to subordinates to carry out a task to take a 
decision (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). 
 
2.2 The Needs Theory Of Abraham H. Maslow 
According to Maslow Self Esteem is a human need that requires fulfillment or satisfaction to proceed to a higher 
level of need. Maslow's need for self esteem is divided into two types: self-esteem and self-esteem. Maslow also 
points out that once a person feels loved and has a sense of belonging, they will develop a need for esteem. An 
employee with a high self esteem is more likely to not engage in a budget slack because the employee believes 
he or she can achieve the targets given to him, and if the employee experiences a non-career career then the 
employee is less likely to engage in a budget slack due to future uncertainties in his career especially during the 
realization of the budget, then subordinates tend not to make budget slack because subordinates feel that they are 
able to achieve the target budget without doing budget slack because self esteem is owned and the employee will 
not be willing to make easy budget achievement, not necessarily the position currently occupied will be occupied 
at the time of budget realization. 
 
2.3 Information Asymmetry 
According to Ompusunggu & Bawono (2006), states that Information that is not fully submitted to superiors 
(budget holders of power) becomes more value for subordinates (implementers of the budget), in the sense that 
subordinates have the advantages of information despite the participation process in the preparation of the 
budget, all information held by subordinates is submitted in the process. So that with the asymmetry of 
information will encourage managers to present inaccurate information and override actual actual circumstances 
especially if the information is related to performance measurement where managers can flexibly to do budget 
slack. 
 
2.4 Budget Emphasis 
Triana, et al (2012) suggests the understanding of budget emphasis as follows: the emphasis budget is the 
insistence of superiors on subordinates to implement the budget that has been made well where employees are 
stimulated with a reward if budget planning is achieved and a penalty if budget planning is not achieved. Asak 
(2014) puts forward the notion of emphasis budget as follows by the insistence of superiors to subordinates to 
run the budget that has been prepared, such as compensation if able to exceed the budget target and sanction if 
the budget target is not reached. 
 
The Effect of Career Uncretainties in Moderating The Relationship Between Asymmetry of Information 
On The Budgetary Slack 
Subordinates who have more information than their superiors tend to make budget slack, because the 
information provided to them is likely to be biased, the budget is based on information that is not in accordance 
with the actual situation then the budget tends to have a gap. But if a subordinate who has more information 
about the actual state of the company does not have confidence in the future of his career, then subordinates tend 
to provide information to the actual information because if the subordinates make budget slack, and the budget is 
easily achieved then the performance of the achievement of the budget is considered good , because subordinate 
careers who have more information about the company are uncertain and there is a possibility that their posisin is 
currently filled by others when the budget is realized then the performance achievement seen under that budget is 
likely to be obtained by someone else who will occupy his position. A subordinate who has information 
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asymmetry and uncertainty over his career then subordinates will likely not make budgetary slack, therefore it is 
suspected that career uncertainty weakens the positive influence between information asymmetry on budgetary 
slack. 
H1. Uncertainty of Career Minimizes Positive Influence between Information Asymmetry and Budget Slack. 
 
The Effect of Career Uncretainties in Moderating The Relationship Between Budget emphasis On The 
Budgetary Slack. 
Budget emphasis is a reward or performance appraisal for subordinates based on the achievement of the budget 
targets or if the leader perceives that his performance and appreciation are judged on the targeted budget. 
Managers who are unable to meet the budget targets will face the possibility of intervention from higher 
management, loss of organizational resources, loss of annual bonuses or at the most extreme point of job loss. In 
these circumstances managers will look for ways to protect themselves from the risk of not achieving budget 
targets. One way of self-protection is to create a budget slack, by setting a budget that is easy to achieve a 
manager will look to have a good performance in the eyes of his leader. However, if the subordinates who feel 
depressed due to the performance appraisal of the achievement of the budget targets at the time of budget 
realization do not have confidence in the future of his career especially when the realization of the budget, 
subordinates tend not to make budget slack because subordinates feel that compensation or reward for the 
achievement of budget targets as the consequences of the budgetary pressures are not necessarily the 
subordinates who feel because of the uncertainty of the career at the time terelasisai budget. Subordinates 
experiencing budget emphasis and experiencing a lack of confidence in their careers subordinates tend not to 
make budget slack, therefore it is suspected that career uncertainty weakens the positive influence between 
budget emphasis on budget slack. 
H2. Uncertainty of career Minimizing Positive Influence between Budget emphasis and Budget Slack. 
 
The Effect of Career Uncretainties in Moderating The Relationship Between Self esteem On The 
Budgetary Slack 
An employee with a high self esteem is more likely to not engage in a budget slack because the employee 
believes he or she can achieve the targets given to him, and if the employee experiences a non-career career then 
the employee is less likely to engage in a budget slack due to future uncertainties in his career especially during 
the realization of the budget, then subordinates tend not to make budget slack because subordinates feel that they 
are able to achieve the target budget without doing budget slack because self asteem owned and the employee 
will not be willing to make easy budget achievement, not necessarily the position currently occupied will be 
occupied at the time of budget realization . Subordinates who have high levels of self esteem and experience 
career uncertainty then subordinates tend not to make budget slack, therefore career uncertainty is expected to 
strengthen the negative influence on budget slack. 
H3: Uncertainty of Career Strengthening the Negative Influence between Self esteem and Budget Slack. 
 
3.  Research Methodology 
Based on the problems studied, the approach used in this research is quantitative approach in the form of 
associative. The location of this research was conducted at the Regional Device Organization (OPD) of Gianyar 
Regency. The type of data in this study is quantitative data and the source data is primary, and the object of 
research in this study is the budget gap in OPD Kabupaten Gianyar. The population in this study is all officials or 
employees who are directly involved in the process of preparing the budget to OPD Gianyar Regency. The 
method of determining the sample in this research is to use the sampling method with purposive sampling 
method, while the criteria for determining the sample in this research are as follows: 1) Has served at least 1 year 
to date, 2) OPD officer of Giayar Regency has become Civil Servant. 
 
 Data analysis technique used in this research is multiple linear regression analysis. This technique of 
analysis is used to determine the influence of information asymmetry, budget emphasis, self esteem, on the 
budget gap with career uncertainty as a moderator. The regression equation is as follows: 
Y= α + β₁X1+ β₂X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β4(X1. X4) + β5(X2. X4) + β6(X3. X4) + e…... (1) 
Where: 
α  = constants 
β  = regression coefficient 
X1        = Information Asimetry 
X2          = Budget emphasis 
X3          = Self esteem 
X4         =  Uncertainty of career 
(X1. X4) = The interaction between information asymmetry and career uncertainty 
(X2. X4) = Interaction between budget emphasis and career uncertainty 
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(X3. X4) = Interaction between self esteem and career uncertainty 
                    e      =  Error 
 
3.1 Operationalization of Variables 
Dependent variable 
Dependent variable is the variables that are influenced or which become due to the existence of independent 
variables (Sugiyono, 2013: 59). The dependent variable in this study is the budgetary slack. 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variable is the variable that influences or causes the change or the incidence of the dependent 
variable (Sugiyono, 2013: 59). Independent variables in this research are information asymmetry, budget 
emphasis, and self esteem. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Instrument Data 
Data were collected by spreading questionnaires to 40 OPD in Ginyar District, the total number of employees in 
OPD of Gianyar Regency as many as 6541 employees, this study specifies 2 parts to be sampled that is the 
financial section and the planning and general part of each OPD Kabupaten Gianyar, distributed questionnaires 
80 copies, but after returning the sample that meets the criteria of sample selection that has been determined then 
the sample that can meet the criteria as many as 67 respondents. 
 
4.2 Test Instrument 
Validity Test 
Validity test in this research is done in 4 research variables, An instrument is said to be valid if the value of r 
pearson correlation to the total score is greater than 0.30 (Sugiyono, 2013: 124). 
 
Table 1. 
Validity Test 
         Source: data processed (2018) 
 
Variable Instrument 
Code 
 
Pearson Correlation Information 
Information Asymmetry 
(X1) 
X1.1 
X1.2 
X1.3 
X1.4 
X1.5 
X1.6 
0,845 
0,889 
0,796 
0,829 
0,943 
0,827 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Budget Emphasis 
 (X2) 
X2.1 
X2.2 
X2.3 
X2.4 
X2.5 
X2.6 
0,879 
0,872 
0,855 
0,781 
0,799 
0,770 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Self Esteem 
 (X3) 
X3.1 
X3.2 
X3.3 
X3.4 
X3.5 
X3.6 
X3.7 
X3.8 
X3.9 
X3.10 
0,681 
0,616 
0,562 
0,703 
0,384 
0,728 
0,515 
0,387 
0,469 
0,629 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Career Uncertainty 
 (X4) 
X4.1 
X4.2 
X4.3 
X4.4 
0,921 
0,966 
0,937 
0,975 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Budgetary Slack 
 (Y) 
Y.1 
Y.2 
Y.3 
Y.4 
Y.5 
Y.6 
0,765 
0,735 
0,765 
0,825 
0,887 
0,683 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
Valid 
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 Based on Table 1, each question of each variable qualifies the validity or can be said to be valid. This is 
because the correlation between the score of each question with a total score above 0.30. 
 
Reliability Test 
Reliability test is done in three research variables, namely good corporate governance, tri hita karana culture and 
quality of financial reporting. Testing reliability of the instrument shows the extent to which a measurement of 
the same symptoms. Reliable instruments are instruments used multiple times to measure the same object and 
produce the same data or answers. Instruments are said to be reliable if they have a Cronbach's alpha value 
greater than 0.60 (Ghozali, 2011: 47-48). 
 
 
Table 2. 
Reliability Test 
No Variable Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Information 
1 Information Asymmetry  (X1) 0,870 Reliabel 
2 Budget Emphasis (X2) 0,906 Reliabel 
3 Self Esteem (X3) 0,720 Reliabel 
4 Career Uncertainty (X4) 0,963 Reliabel 
5 Budgetary Slack (Y) 0,870 Reliabel 
    Source: data processed (2018) 
 
Based on Table 2, all research instruments are said to be reliable. The overall value of Cronbach's alpha 
greater than 0.60 indicates that such measurements can provide consistent results when re-measurements of the 
same subject at different times. 
 
Classic assumption test 
Normality Test 
Normality test aims to test whether the data is normally distributed or not. A good regression model is a 
regression model that is normally distributed or close to normal. Normality test used Kolmogorov-smirnov test. 
Data is normally distributed if it has a significance level above 0.05 (Asimp Sig (2-tailed)> 0.05) (Ghozali, 2011: 
160). 
 
 
Table 3 
Normality Test 
   Unstandardi
zed Residual 
N  67 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z   0,210 
      Source: data processed (2018) 
 
Based on Table 3, the value of Asimp Sig (2-tailed) of the normality test is 0.151 or greater than 0.05. 
This shows that the model in this study normal distribution, so that data can be used in research. 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity test aims to determine whether the regression model does not occured inequality of variant 
and residual one observation to another observation. If the variant of the residual one observation to another 
observation remains, it is called homocedasticity and if different is called heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedastisity 
test in this research used Glejser test. This method is done by correlating the residual value of regression result 
with each independent variable. The regression model does not contain any heteroscedasticity if the probability 
is above the 0.05 trust level (Ghozali, 2011: 139). 
 
 
  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.9, No.14, 2018 
 
130 
Table 4. 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Variable Sig. Information 
Information Asymmetry (X1) 0,075 Heteroskedasitas Free 
Budget Emphasis  (X2) 0,750 Heteroskedasitas Free 
Self Esteem (X3) 0,088 Heteroskedasitas Free 
Career Uncertainty (X4) 0,057 Heteroskedasitas Free 
(X1* X4) 0,177 Heteroskedasitas Free 
(X2* X4) 0,917 Heteroskedasitas Free 
(X3* X4) 0,195 Heteroskedasitas Free 
    Source: data processed (2018) 
 
Based on the heteroscedasticity test in Table 4, the significance value of the dependent variable, Absolute 
Residual (ABRES), is indicated by the t-significance value which is all greater than alpha (ɑ = 0.05). So it can be 
concluded that the regression model found no symptoms of heteroscedasticity. 
 
Multicolinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test aims to determine whether in the regression model there is a correlation between 
independent variables. A good regression model is a regression model that is independent of the correlation 
between independent variables. The multicollinearity test is measured by the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and 
tolerance values. 
 
 
Table 7 
Multicolinearity Test 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Information Asymmetry (X1) 0,832 1,848 
Budget Emphasis  (X2) 0,988 1,417 
Self Esteem (X3) 0,743 1,016 
Career Uncertainty (X4) 0,351 1,621 
(X1* X4) 0,221 1,628 
(X2* X4) 0,258 1,156 
(X3* X4) 0,928 1,570 
                               Source: data processed (2018) 
 
Based on the results in Table 5, it can be seen that no independent variable has tolerance value less than 
0.10 and VIF value more than 10. Analysis shows that there are no symptoms of multicolinearity to research 
variables, so feasible use in subsequent research. 
 
 
5. Regression Result 
 This research uses multiple linier regression analysis which contains interaction between independent 
variable or Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA). MRA is a special application of multiple linear regression in 
its regression equation contains the element of interaction (multiplication of two or more independent variables). 
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Tabel 9 
Multiple Linear Regession Analysis 
Variabel Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
T Sig 
B Std. Error Beta 
Constant 23,244 3,633  6,398 0,000 
X1 1,314 0,194 2,120 6,784 0,000 
X2 0,477 0,120 0,758 3,987 0,000 
X3 
-1,419 0,145 -1,457 -9,778 0,000 
X4 
-0,292 0,110 -0,383 -2,646 0,010 
(X1* X4) 
-0,148 0,023 -0,508 -6,460 0,000 
(X2* X4) 
-0,024 0,011 -0,487 -2,088 0,041 
(X3* X4) 0,126 0,015 2,909 8,669 0,000 
Adjusted Rsquare  :  0,791 
Fhitung  : 36,712 
Sig. Fhitung  :        0,000 
        Source: data processed (2018) 
 
Based on Table 7 we can make the following equation. 
Y = 23,24 + 1,31X1 + 0,48X2 – 1,42X3 – 0,292X4 – 0,148(X1*X4) – 0,024(X2*X4) + 0,126(X3*X4) +  
e........................................................................ (2) 
 
Based on the above equation, can be explained things as follows. Constant value of 23.24 shows that the 
value of information asymmetry, budget emphasis, self esteem, career uncertainty equal to zero, then budget 
slack will tend to experience an increase. The value of the information asymmetry regression coefficient (β1) of 
1.31 indicates if the asymmetry of information increases by one unit, then budget slack will tend to experience 
an increase with the assumption that the other variable is equal to zero. The value of the regression coefficient of 
budget emphasis (β2) of 0.48 shows that if the budget emphasis increases one unit, then budget slack will tend to 
experience an increase with the assumption that the other variable is equal to zero. The value of the self esteem 
regression coefficient (β3) of -1.42 indicates that if slef esteem increases one unit, then budget slack will tend to 
experience a decrease with the assumption that the other variable is zero. The value of regression coefficient of 
career uncertainty (β4) of -0.292 indicates if career uncertainty increases one unit, then budget slack will tend to 
experience a decrease with assumption other variable equal to zero. 
 The value of regression coefficient of interaction between asymmetry of information with role uncertainty 
(β5) equal to -0,148 indicates when interaction between information asymmetry with career uncertainty increase 
one unit, hence influence of information asymmetry at budget slack tended to decrease with assumption other 
variable equal to zero. The value of regression coefficient of interaction between budget emphasis with role 
uncertainty (β6) equal to -0,024 indicates when interaction between budget emphasis with career uncertainty 
increase one unit, hence influence of budget emphasis on budget slack tend to decrease with assumption other 
variable equal to zero. The value of regression coefficient of interaction between selft esteem with role 
uncertainty (β6) equal to -0.13 indicates when the interaction between budget emphasis with career uncertainty 
increase one unit, then influence selft esteem on budget slack tend to increase with assumption other variable 
equal to zero. In Tabe 7 it shows that the magnitude of adjusted R2 is 0.791. This indicates that 79.1% 
variations in sidebar levers can be explained by the variable of information asymmetry, budget emphasis, self 
esteem, and uncertainty while the remaining 20.9% is explained by other variables outside the model. Table 7 
shows that the F value is 36.71 with significant value of F or p-value of 0.000 which is smaller than α = 0,05. 
This means the variable asymmetry information, budget emphasis, self esteem, career uncertainty, interaction 
information asymteri with career uncertainty, budget interaction emphasis with career uncertainty, self esteem 
interaction with career uncertainty simultaneously (influence) on company performance. 
The statistical test t basically shows how far the influence of one independent variable individually or 
individually in explaining the variation of the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2011). More data can be seen in 
Table 7, the interaction variable between information asymmetry (X1) and career uncertainty (X4) has a 
moderate coefficient of - 0.148 with a significance level of 0.000. The sig t number is smaller than 0.05 which 
means that H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted. The regression coefficient of information asymmetric variable is 
1,314 with a significance level of 0,000 so that information asymmetry has a positive influence on budget slack. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.9, No.14, 2018 
 
132 
The higher the level of information asymmetry the budget slack will increase, hence it can be concluded that 
with the existence of career uncertainty will weaken the relationship between information asymmetry and budget 
slack. 
Interaction variable between budget emphasis (X2) with career uncertainty (X4) has moderate coefficient 
equal to - 0,024 with significance level equal to 0,041. The sig t number is smaller than 0.05 which means that 
H0 is rejected and H2 is accepted. The regression coefficient of budget emphasis variable is 0,477 with 
significance level 0,000 so that budget emphasis have positive influence on budget slack. The higher the level of 
budget emphasis the budget slack will increase, therefore it can be concluded that with the existence of career 
uncertainty will weaken the relationship between budget emphasis with budget slack. 
The interaction variable between self esteem (X3) and career uncertainty (X4) has a moderate 
coefficient of 0.126 with a significance level of 0.000. The sig t number is smaller than 0.05 which means that 
H0 is rejected and H3 is accepted. The regression coefficient of self esteem variable is -1.419 with a significance 
level of 0.000, so self esteem has a negative influence on budget slack. The higher the level of self esteem the 
slack of the budget will decrease, therefore it can be concluded that with the existence of career uncertainty will 
strengthen the relationship between budget emphasis with budget slack. The results of this study showed that the 
regression coefficient of information asymmetry has a positive sign, it shows that the higher the level of 
information asymmetry then budget slack will tend to increase. The moderate coefficient of interaction between 
information asymmetry and career uncertainty has a negative sign and a significant value of t is smaller than the 
value of α. This means that the first hypothesis of career uncertainty moderating the effect of asymmetric 
nformation on budgetary slack is acceptable. 
Saad (2002) explains that the information slack possessed by subordinates is usually utilized for his own 
personal interests or securing his position in the achievement of certain targets, therefore in exchange of 
information between superiors and subordinates usually subordinates provide information that is not real or 
biased. Similar statements are also put forward by Rumana (2013) who conducts research on information 
asymmetry on budgetary slack, where the results show that information asymmetry has a positive influence on 
budgetary slack, with information slack between subordinates and superiors more likely to cause budget slack. 
Larger information owned by subordinates than their superiors tends to make budget slack, because the 
information given to them is likely to be biased, the budget is based on information that is not in accordance with 
the actual situation then the budget tends to have a gap. But if a subordinate who has more information about the 
actual state of the company does not have confidence in the future of his career, then subordinates tend to 
provide information to the actual information because if the subordinates make budget slack, and the budget is 
easily achieved then the performance of the achievement of the budget is considered good , because a 
subordinate's career that has more information about the company is uncertain and there is a possibility that his 
position is currently filled by others when the budget is realized then the performance achievement seen under 
that budget is likely to be obtained by someone else who will occupy his position. Subordinates who have 
information asymmetry and experience uncertainty over their career then subordinates tend not to make budget 
slack, therefore career uncertainty weakens the positive relationship between information asymmetry and budget 
slack. 
The results of this study showed that the regression coefficient of budget emphasis has a positive sign, it 
shows that the higher the budget level, the budget slack will tend to increase. Moderate coefficient of interaction 
between budget emphasis with career uncertainty has negative sign and significant level of t value that is smaller 
than α value. This means that a second hypothesis stating that career uncertainties moderate the influence of 
budget emphasis on budget slack is acceptable. 
 Jaya (2013) explains that a collection of contracts between principals and genes creates a budget 
emphasis, agency theory explains that the emphasis budget is an insistence from superiors to subordinates to 
implement the budget well and reach budget targets. If an employee's performance is determined by an 
established budgetary achievement, then the targeted subordinate with the budget as a performance appraisal will 
strive to achieve the budget targets to achieve a predetermined budget by creating a budget slack, so that 
employees will more easily reach their budget and performance targets also looks good. Similar statements are 
also put forward by researchers Mulyani & Rahman (2012), and Maya et al. (2012) which states that budget 
emphasis has significant influence on budget slack, so the conclusion is budget emphasis allegedly have positive 
influence on budget slack. 
 Providing rewards for the achievement of predetermined budget targets is an employee objective in 
order to perform well and get compensation that has been promised in achieving the target. Budget targets that 
are not achieved by employees will have a serious impact that compensation can not be obtained, positions that 
are at stake because of the possibility to be replaced with more competent employees in their field, therefore 
employees are more likely to make budget slack because it is perceived to protect its position and reach the 
target expected by the employee. Budget made easy will be easier to achieve, so that the performance of 
employees look good or increased visible from the achievement of the budget that has been set previously. 
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 However, if the subordinates who feel depressed due to the performance appraisal of the achievement of 
the budget targets at the time of budget realization do not have confidence in the future of his career especially 
when the realization of the budget, subordinates tend not to make budget slack because subordinates feel that 
compensation or reward for the achievement of budget targets as the consequences of the budgetary pressures 
are not necessarily the subordinates who feel because of the uncertainty of the career at the time terelasisai 
budget. Subordinates experiencing budget emphasis and experiencing a lack of confidence in their careers 
subordinates tend not to make budget slack, therefore it is suspected that career uncertainty weakens the positive 
influence between budget emphasis on budget slack. 
 The results of this study showed that the coefficient of self esteem regression has a negative sign, it shows 
that the higher the level of self esteem then budget slack will tend to decrease. The moderate coefficient of 
interaction between self esteem and career uncertainty has positive sign and significant t value that is smaller 
than α value. This means that a second hypothesis stating the career uncertainty moderating the influence of self 
esteem on a budget slack is acceptable. 
 Sharma & Agarwala (2014) explains that self esteem is a person's self-confidence, self-satisfaction 
towards a thing and self-respect. People who have high self esteem tend to see themselves as important, 
influential, and valuable in a job they do. Conversely, people who have low self esteem will feel bad with him. 
Kreitner & Kinicki (2004) explains that someone who feels himself is so important, valuable, and influential it 
will arise confidence in the work he did because what he did was successful and create optimal results. 
 An employee with a high self esteem is more likely to not engage in a budget slack because the employee 
believes he or she can achieve the targets given to him, and if the employee experiences a non-career career then 
the employee is less likely to engage in a budget slack due to future uncertainties in his career especially during 
the realization of the budget, then subordinates tend not to make budget slack because subordinates feel that they 
are able to achieve the target budget without doing budget slack because self asteem owned and the employee 
will not be willing to make easy budget achievement, not necessarily the position currently occupied will be 
occupied at the time of budget realization . Subordinates who have high levels of self esteem and experience 
career uncertainty then subordinates tend not to make budget slack, therefore career uncertainty is expected to 
strengthen the negative influence on budget slack. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Based on the results of analysis and discussion in the previous chapters can be concluded as follows career 
uncertainty weaken the positive relationship between information asymteri with budget slack on OPD in Gianyar 
regency. This shows that the higher level of career uncertainty owned by employees and employees have more 
information than their superiors then budget slack will tend to decrease. The career uncertainty weakens the 
positive relationship between budget emphasis and budgetary slack on OPD in Gianyar regency. This shows that 
the higher level of career uncertainty owned by employees and employees experiencing budget emphasis then 
budget slack will tend to decrease. Career uncertainty strengthens the negative relationship between self esteem 
and budgetary slack at OPD in Gianyar regency. This shows that the higher level of career uncertainty owned by 
employees and employees are self-esteem the budget slack will tend to decrease. 
Based on the results of the research that has been discussed, explaining that information asymmetry and 
budget emphasis increase a budget slack on OPD in Gianyar regency, therefore information asymmetry or 
information slack happened between subordinates with superiors should be minimized by building a two-way 
communication, so the slack information between superiors and subordinates tends to be lower and the 
likelihood of budget slippage will be lower and for budget emphasis should the organization not perform an 
employee performance assessment only from the achievement of the budget targets that have been prepared and 
add supporting factors in the assessment of employee performance, career uncertainty may weaken budget slack, 
but to anticipate budget slack. Subsequent research is suggested in order to add another variable either as a 
moderation variable or independent variable, and expand the sample research so that the results of research can 
generalize the study population. 
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